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SUMMARY
For all the job booms and wealth that have benefitted Alberta over the 
decades, nothing yet has been able to drastically reduce, let alone eliminate 
poverty in the province. The prospect of a guaranteed minimum income could 
help change that, and Alberta is particularly well positioned to roll one out and with 
relative ease and at a manageable cost.
An Alberta guaranteed basic income could be straightforwardly developed by 
revising the existing provincial tax system to make tax credits that are currently 
non-refundable into refundable tax credits, such that people earning below the 
minimum income-tax threshold will still be able to claim them as subsidies. This 
can be done while avoiding significant new funding and relying solely on budgetary 
measures to improve the fairness of the tax system.
Converting just a few non-refundable tax credits into refundable ones can 
produce a guaranteed annual income of over $6,000 for a single-adult family and 
over $9,000 for a two-adult family, with no significant new funding required. 
This would improve supports for 37 per cent of Alberta families, with the largest 
gains properly concentrated among the poorest households, and would reduce the 
rate and depth of poverty by 25 per cent. 
An even more powerful approach would be if Alberta were able to persuade the 
federal government to combine a similar program federally with the provincial 
guaranteed basic income, converting non-refundable credits into refundable 
ones and eliminating the federal GST credit. A combined federal-provincial 
guaranteed annual income would increase dramatically to over $13,600 a year 
for a single-adult family and to over $19,000 a year for a two-adult family. The 
disposal income of the poorest 20 per cent of Albertans 
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1would increase by more than 50 per cent under the combined plan, while the rate of 
poverty across all Albertans would be cut by a substantial 44 per cent. Among single 
parents and non-elderly and elderly couples, poverty would be eliminated 
completely. And while two-parent families and non-elderly singles would continue to be in 
poverty, its rate declines significantly and its depth would be reduced by more than half. 
The success of such a plan, of course, requires people with low incomes, even those below 
the basic income-tax exemption, to file tax returns in order to be eligible for the 
refundable credits. Fortunately, filing rates are already high in Canada. Besides the task of 
raising filing rates higher, the appeal of this approach is that it is otherwise relatively easy to 
implement as a basic tax reform. Several other provinces and the federal government have 
publicly pondered the possibility of a guaranteed minimum income. Alberta now has 
the opportunity to implement one with little disruption to the existing social-support 
system and no significant additional expenses, targeting poverty in the province in what 
may prove to be a more effective way than has ever been tried before.
21. INTRODUCTION
Poverty remains a persistent problem even in advanced economies, and Canada is no exception. 
Indeed, the Conference Board of Canada (2018) recently ranked Canada 13th among 16 peer OECD 
countries in overall poverty and 15th in child poverty, ahead only of the United States, despite a 
parliamentary resolution in 1989 to eliminate child poverty by the end of the last century. The 
Conference Board report notes a consensus that poverty “can lead to higher crime rates, illness, 
substance abuse, and poor educational outcomes, which, in turn, affect the economy through lost 
productivity (and) can also lead to discrimination, inequity, and social exclusion.” The report 
coincides with renewed policy discussion of a basic or guaranteed income at the provincial and 
federal levels, including Quebec’s proposed “revenu minimum garanti” (Gouvernement du Québec, 
2018), Ontario’s recently cancelled basic-income pilot project (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2016), 
plans for a focused exploration of a basic income in British Columbia (BC Gov News, 2018), and 
the federal Liberal party platform proposal for a “minimum guaranteed income” (Liberal Party of 
Canada, 2016). It also coincides with renewed efforts by the federal government to address child 
poverty through implementation in the 2016 federal budget of an enriched Canada Child Benefit 
that conforms to the basic design of a guaranteed income for families with children. The federal 
initiative is supported by an Alberta Child Benefit for low-income parents introduced in 2015 
Alberta budget.1
While Alberta has fared better than other Canadian provinces in terms of economic growth, 
poverty remains an important provincial problem. Since 1981, the Alberta economy has grown 
at an average annual rate of 3.0 per cent, well above the Canadian average of 2.4 per cent and the 
average growth rate of all other provinces including Saskatchewan (1.8 per cent), Newfoundland 
(2.1 per cent) and Prince Edward Island (2.2 per cent). Yet the Alberta poverty rate, based on 
Statistics Canada’s after-tax Low Income Cut-Offs, only fell from eight per cent of the population 
in 1981 to 6.1 per cent in 2015. Other slower-growing provinces have fared better on the poverty-
reduction front, however, including Saskatchewan (12.2 to 5.8 per cent), Newfoundland (13.3 to 
6.0 per cent) and Prince Edward Island (12 to 6.3 per cent), perhaps as a result of migration to 
more rapidly growing areas of the country. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 1, the poverty rate in 
Alberta has fallen pretty much in lock step with the Canadian rate despite impressive growth in the 
province, suggesting that economic growth alone will not solve the poverty problem. A substantial 
amount of the decline in poverty occurred from 1997 to 2008, but Figure 1 shows that poverty rates 
have stabilized in Alberta and the rest of Canada since then.
In this paper, we analyze the prospects for poverty reduction in Alberta today through a guaranteed 
basic income (GBI). Alberta provides an interesting opportunity to study GBI schemes. Although 
Alberta’s rapid growth has not swept away poverty, its prosperity is reflected in some significant 
tax differences with other provinces, particularly a very generous system of non-refundable 
basic personal tax credits and some important refundable tax credits that we discuss and assess 
below. In the next section, we discuss the options for poverty reduction from the development 
of a guaranteed-basic-income plan, including plans that involve tax reform and plans that would 
involve a standalone basic income program. We argue for the benefits of the tax-reform approach 
that would make existing non-refundable tax credits refundable. We then introduce our analytical 
vehicle, version 26.0 of the Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M), to review 
the existing system of tax credits in Alberta. Section 3 sets out the design options for an Alberta 
guaranteed basic income (AGBI) and Section 4 evaluates their impact along multiple dimensions, 
including reduction of poverty and income inequality, earnings from the labour market, and 
1 
See the Alberta Government website at https://www.alberta.ca/alberta-child-benefit.aspx.
3population coverage. Section 5 examines the impact of two specific AGBI options, while Section 
6 looks at the impact of an AGBI that is tied to a comparable federal plan. Section 7 provides a 
summary and concluding remarks.
FIGURE 1 POVERTY RATES BASED ON THE AFTER-TAX LICO FOR CANADA AND ALBERTA, 1981–2015
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Sources: Statistics Canada Table 202-0802 (“Persons in low income families, annual”) and Table 206-0041  
(“Low income statistics by age, sex and economic family type, Canada, provinces and selected census metropolitan 
areas, annual”).
2. POVERTY AND THE TAX-CREDIT SYSTEM IN ALBERTA
In the previous section we indicated that the Alberta poverty rate stood at 6.1 per cent of the 
population using the 2015 Canada Income Survey and the traditional yardstick of the Low 
Income Cut-Offs (LICOs) developed by Statistics Canada. This measure of low income, based on 
consumption patterns for necessities (food, shelter and clothing) and differentiated by family and 
community size, has been criticized as an indicator of poverty (Collin and Campbell, 2008) and 
has been replaced as Canada’s official poverty measure by the Market Basket Measure (MBM), 
which determines the cost of purchasing a basket of goods and services for a reference family of 
two adults and two children for different regions of Canada (Wilkins and Kneebone, 2018). Version 
26.0 of SPSD/M does not allow us to calculate the MBM measure, however, so we adopt the 
traditional LICO measure of the incidence and depth of poverty in this paper.
What guaranteed-basic-income options are available to address poverty in Alberta? We can 
distinguish broadly two approaches to begin the design of an Alberta guaranteed basic income 
(AGBI). The first approach would be a new, standalone AGBI. This type of plan has been 
discussed, promoted and tested for decades without significant progress, largely due to the 
potentially prohibitive cost and potential work disincentives (Hum and Simpson, 2001). Such 
standalone plans continue to be studied at the national level, most recently by Boadway et al (2016) 
and the Parliamentary Budget Office (2018). We have argued that a new plan of this nature is not 
necessary, however, because an AGBI can be developed by revising the existing tax system to make 
4currently non-refundable tax credits refundable (Simpson and Stevens, 2015; Stevens and Simpson, 
2017). This second approach is potentially more attractive politically because it can be designed to 
avoid significant new funding and can rely solely on budgetary measures to improve the fairness of 
the tax system. Our earlier research developed and evaluated a guaranteed-basic-income plan for 
Canada that included provincial participation, providing an alternative framework to a standalone 
provincial plan that we propose to explore more carefully here in the Alberta context.
An important aspect of the Alberta context is the system of tax credits in the province. Table 1 
shows the distribution of provincial non-refundable tax credit (NRTC) claims across the income 
spectrum in Alberta, using version 26.0 of the Social Policy Simulation Database and Model 
(SPSD/M). SPSD/M offers a useful vehicle for this type of microsimulation exercise based on 
personal income tax data augmented by other administrative and survey data (Statistics Canada, 
2013). Reading down the table, the tax credits are itemized and divided into those that we would 
propose to replace with refundable tax credits (RTCs) to develop an Alberta guaranteed basic 
income (AGBI), based on the arguments we developed in Stevens and Simpson (2017), and those 
that we would propose to leave in place in their current form as NRTCs. Reading across the table, 
we report, by adjusted economic-family income decile, the total number of claimants for each type 
of credit and the amount of the credit, as a per cent of taxable income, that was applied to reduce 
tax payable to $0. We use economic-family income because it is the basis for calculating poverty 
rates and we adjust economic-family income throughout our analysis by the square root of family 
size to allow for comparisons across families of different sizes, a convention used by Statistics 
Canada in presenting income data for the 2016 Census.
Table 1 indicates that a total of 3,395,000 Albertans claimed some provincial tax credit in 2017, 
including the universally applicable basic personal amount. These credits constituted 4.06 per cent 
of taxable income for all taxpayers but were much more important for lower-income taxpayers, 
constituting 8.91 and 8.40 per cent, respectively, of taxable income for the two lowest family-
income deciles. The basic credit is not only the sole credit that is universally claimed but is also, by 
far, the most important credit, accounting for 60 per cent of the value of all provincial tax credits. 
Families in the lowest income decile (up to $24,242) receive the most benefit from this credit, 
accounting for 6.06 per cent of their taxable income and 68 per cent of all income from provincial 
credits, and taxpayers benefit less as the family-income decile rises. The married and equivalent 
credit is the next largest credit, accounting for 1.01 per cent of taxable income for those who claim 
it, but only 416,000 Albertans or 12.3 per cent of the adult population claim the credit. A much 
larger proportion, 69.8 per cent, claim the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) credit, but its value is only 
0.22 per cent of taxable income.2
The universal entitlement and relative size of the basic credit makes it the cornerstone of any AGBI 
involving the conversion of NRTCs to RTCs in the fashion discussed in Stevens and Simpson 
(2017). Indeed, Alberta’s relatively aggressive increases in its basic personal amount starting in 
2001 (Alberta Treasury Board and Finance, 2000) have made this credit an important part of 
Alberta’s “tax advantage” this century (Eisen, Lafleur and Palacios, 2017), as the Alberta basic 
amount of $18,690 dwarfs its federal and provincial counterparts.3 Although the credit is somewhat 
2 That is, compared to the 2.42 per cent of taxable income represented by the basic claim for all Alberta taxpayers, the 
married and CPP credits only account for 0.12 and 0.15 per cent, respectively, of taxable income for all taxpayers, or less 
than 1/40th as much, once their more limited applications (12 per cent for the married and 70 per cent for the CPP credit) are 
considered. Other credits are correspondingly smaller.
3 The Alberta credit is roughly double that of all other provinces except Saskatchewan, where is it still 16-per-cent higher: 
https://www.taxtips.ca/nrcredits/tax-credits-2017-base.htm.
5progressive in the sense that it provides proportionately more income to taxpayers in families in 
lower income deciles, the design of the basic personal amount as a non-refundable credit means 
that it does not provide any benefit to individuals with incomes below the credit level, who are 
most in need of income support. Thus, conversion of this NRTC offers a particularly significant 
opportunity to improve the incomes of Alberta’s lowest-income families. It also offers an 
opportunity to improve the fairness of the Alberta tax system in the sense that the full benefits of 
the credit would accrue to all families, not just those above the level of the credit.
TABLE 1  ALBERTA PROVINCIAL NRTC CLAIMS1 BY TYPE AS A PER CENT OF TAXABLE INCOME BY ADJUSTED 
ECONOMIC-FAMILY INCOME DECILE3
Type  
of NRTC
Total  
Adults  
(000s)
Adjusted Economic-Family Income Decile3
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Basic* 3,395 6.06 5.32 4.59 3.94 3.36 3.15 2.64 2.29 2.05 0.88 2.42
Age* 473 n/a4 0.63 1.08 1.04 0.86 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.85 0.77 0.80
Pension 
Income* 546 0.09 0.15 0.28 0.21 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.01
Education* 158 0.03 0.51 0.58 0.36 0.35 0.28 0.40 0.31 0.28 0.20 0.32
Tuition* 172 0.17 0.56 0.55 0.34 0.28 0.44 0.41 0.33 0.43 0.25 0.37
Student  
Loan Int.* 69 0.11 0.21 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.10
Sub-Total*2 3,395 6.86 6.41 5.11 4.45 3.63 3.39 2.87 2.46 2.19 0.94 2.65
Married/MEq. 416 1.24 2.00 1.68 1.69 1.24 1.03 0.91 0.93 0.67 0.26 1.01
Caregiver 29 0.25 1.75 1.59 2.25 3.19 0.61 1.42 0.64 0.54 0.24 1.29
Charitable 836 0.16 0.23 0.35 0.46 0.35 0.44 0.23 0.37 0.23 0.23 0.27
CPP 2,370 0.09 0.30 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.10 0.22
EI 2,331 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.06
Disability 88 0.32 0.58 2.24 2.11 2.12 2.14 2.33 1.45 1.24 0.65 1.41
Infirm 
Dependent 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12
Dividend 570 0.26 0.22 0.32 0.80 0.93 0.92 0.95 1.30 1.08 2.11 1.63
Medical 322 0.19 0.14 0.32 0.52 0.25 0.45 0.36 0.35 0.15 0.10 0.24
Total 3,395 8.91 8.40 6.57 5.90 4.76 4.44 3.86 3.67 3.17 2.78 4.06
Note:
* NRTCs deleted to finance the GBI. 
1  The claims represent the value of just that portion of the NRTC used to reduce tax  payable to $0 for just those 
individuals claiming the credit. 
2  Except for the bottom decile 1, the subtotal is less than the sum of the individual items because of the differing number 
of adults claiming them.
3 Economic-family income is adjusted by the square root of family size throughout our  analysis.
4 No observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations from SPSD/M 26.0. (All subsequent tables have the same source unless otherwise stated.)
In addition to these non-refundable tax credits, Alberta provides several income-tested benefits. 
These benefits can be used to expand the AGBI or can be left to stand on their own as part of the 
provincial income-support program, as we investigate in section 5.2. Designed in the form of 
6refundable tax credits, they include the aforementioned Alberta Child Benefit, the Alberta Family 
Employment Tax Credit, the Alberta Seniors Benefit, and the Alberta Carbon Levy Rebate. These 
programs, which are described in more detail in Appendix A, already provide modest benefits 
based on family size and composition that are reduced according to family income to target benefits 
to lower-income families in the fashion that we would propose on a much larger scale for the AGBI. 
3. DESIGNING AN AGBI
There a number of elements to the design of a guaranteed basic income (GBI), including:
• the sources of financing and the total budget;
• the size of the guarantee and whether that guarantee will vary by family size;
• the type of family unit which will be the focus of the program; 
• the benefit-reduction rate to be applied to other income;
• the definition of “other income.”
We address these issues in turn in this section.4
Sources of Income and the Budget
The primary source of income for financing an AGBI is the elimination of the six NRTCs marked 
with an asterisk in the top six rows of Table 1. The total value of those NRTCs in Alberta in 2017 
was estimated to be $5,357.7 million. In addition to those NRTCs, there are a number of provincial 
refundable tax credits that could be incorporated into the AGBI, including the Alberta Child 
Benefit, the Alberta Family Employment Tax Credit, the Alberta Seniors Benefit and the Alberta 
Carbon Levy Rebate. In 2017, the total value of these refundable tax credits was $1,038.9 million. 
In total then, up to $6,396.6 million of existing spending could be reallocated to finance an AGBI. 
With the loss of these refundable tax credits, however, SPSD/M estimates that the decline in after-
tax income leads to an increase in social-assistance spending of $286.0 million in Alberta, resulting 
in a net budget of $6,110.6 million. On this basis, we model two illustrative AGBIs below, the first 
with a budget of $5,357.7 million without the provincial refundable credits and the second with a 
budget of $6,110.6 million that includes the provincial credits. 
The Size of the Guarantee, Benefit-Reduction Rate and Exit Level of Income
Within a given budget, the size of the guarantee (G) depends on several other program parameters, 
the chief one of which is the benefit-reduction rate (BRR). That is, the basic algebra of a refundable 
tax credit is:
 Net Benefit = G – (Family Income x BRR) [1]
A whole menu of guarantees and BRRs can therefore be specified to maintain the same net benefit 
and corresponding program cost, but the guarantee can only increase when the BRR rises as well 
4 
Another design issue that we do not consider here is an income turning point below which there is no benefit reduction and 
the poorest families realize the full value of the benefit. This is a common feature of federal and provincial income-transfer 
programs but it involves a trade-off, since providing a turning point necessarily raises the benefit-reduction rate for those 
with incomes above the turning point (or else lowers the generosity of the benefit guaranteed to the poorest families) in 
order to constrain the total cost of the program to the available budget.
7to offer a higher, more targeted benefit to fewer taxpayers. Hence, we consider below our approach 
to evaluating the various guarantee and BRR combinations in terms of multiple impacts and 
objectives. 
The value of the guarantee can be “topped up” by a fixed amount to recognize the additional 
cost of such conditions as a disability or the presence of an infirm adult dependent, both of which 
are recognized by the federal and provincial tax codes. In our designs, we have topped up the 
guarantee for families where a person with a disability or an infirm adult dependent is present by 
an amount that reflects the value of the current non-refundable tax credit for each condition: $1,450 
for persons claiming the disability tax credit and $1,080 for those claiming the caregiver tax credit. 
As well, the value of the guarantee can be indexed by family size. An accepted approach is the 
index used by Statistics Canada to define its low-income measure, based on the square root of the 
size of the family. In our designs, however, we have chosen to vary the guarantee by the square root 
of the number of adults in the family unit because the federal Canada Child Benefit already offers 
a refundable tax credit for dependent children in the family unit. While the net value of the GBI is 
determined on the basis of family income, each adult is assigned an equal share of the net benefit, 
and it is this amount that is used to calculate labour-supply response. 
The choice of a guarantee and BRR defines the “exit” (or breakeven) level of family income, 
equal to G/BRR, at which the guarantee is reduced to $0. Table 2 below shows the exit levels 
corresponding to the different combinations of G and BRR. It reveals that as G and BRR rise, the 
exit level drops, thus reducing the number of families gaining from the conversion of NRTCs to 
refundable credits. 
The GBI Recipient Unit
Several types of family units can be the recipient of a GBI, including the individual adult, the 
nuclear, census or economic family, or the household. Some GBI designs, such as the universal 
demogrant, favour the individual adult as the recipient unit. Most refundable tax credits, however, 
use some version of the family as the recipient unit and use family income as the basis for clawing 
back the value of the guarantee. Because the personal income tax system will be used to determine 
the size of the net benefit, the “nuclear family” that includes parents and dependent children 
under 18 years old will be our GBI recipient unit. Adults 18 years of age and older living with 
their parents who are not being claimed as a dependent by a parent are eligible for their own GBI, 
consistent with existing personal income tax provisions. 
The Definition of Family Income
In our designs, we have chosen to define family income according to the Canada Revenue Agency 
(CRA) definition of “total income” (line 150 of the tax return) plus the value of the Alberta 
refundable tax credits less CRA allowable deductions for all parents. This definition excludes the 
Canada Child Benefit because it is effectively a part of the AGBI, but the definition includes social-
assistance income because our proposal supplements welfare payments rather than replaces them. 
By including social-assistance benefits in the definition of total income, the guarantee is reduced 
by the value of these benefits multiplied by the BRR. The definition of family income includes the 
Alberta refundable credits for our first option but excludes the credits for our second option.
84. EVALUATING AGBI OPTIONS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES
Using the SPSD/M package, we can measure a variety of outcomes affected by the introduction of 
a GBI, including the incidence and depth of poverty, income inequality, labour-market earnings and 
disposable income. Unless we are willing to focus on a single objective to the exclusion of others, 
or unless the multiple objectives improve in concert, we must typically trade off some objectives 
against others. Thus, while the primary objective of any GBI is poverty reduction, this outcome 
must be measured against its adverse effect on other objectives. From a theoretical standpoint, for 
example, as a GBI reduces poverty, the higher BRR will reduce incentives to work and earn income 
and the number of families that will qualify as beneficiaries will decline. Specifically, a menu 
of GBIs for a given budget constraint featuring rising guarantees and rising BRRs is expected 
to result in nontrivial trade-offs: Poverty and income inequality will decline at the expense of 
earnings losses and fewer GBI recipients. If that is supported by the evidence, the best that our 
analysis can do is identify the inherent trade-offs arising from the implementation of a GBI through 
refundable tax credits. In that case, the choice of a GBI remains a subjective exercise arising from a 
preferred balancing of conflicting objectives.
Table 2 presents the results of a menu of these options. Each option consists of a combination of G 
and BRR that was established by first setting the value of the BRR and then determining the value 
of G that resulted in the total cost of the program equalling the budget constraint. For example, 
a basic income with no BRR would result in a G of only $1,883 for a single adult, while the 
introduction of a modest BRR of 10 per cent raises the G to $6,389. The effects of the options are 
based on after-tax income after taking into account the labour-supply response (as explained below 
in Section 5) and the changes in tax payable resulting from the elimination of the NRTCs and 
receipt of the AGBI. The rate and depth of poverty have been measured at the level of the economic 
family using the after-tax LICO, as this is the family unit at which the LICO is measured. The other 
outcomes have been assessed at the nuclear-family level because this is the family unit at which the 
net value of the AGBI is assessed and delivered.5 The change in earnings is for those who are AGBI 
beneficiaries, while the per cent change in disposable income is presented for the losers, i.e., those 
whose disposable income dropped because the increase in taxes paid was greater than the AGBI 
benefit. 
Table 2 reflects our expectations that a rising guarantee (G) and benefit-reduction rate (BRR) 
for a given budget provides conflicting results. First, as we examine options for which the G and 
BRR rise, there is a greater reduction in the poverty rate and the depth of poverty, and a gradual 
reduction in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. In particular, the introduction of a 
positive BRR (10 per cent) to target GBI benefits to low-income households results in a sharp 
increase in G. For a single adult, for example, G increases from $1,883 to $6,389, which adds 
5 
The standard Statistics Canada definitions of nuclear and economic families are found at https://www150.statcan.
gc.ca/n1/pub/75f0011x/2011001/notes/fam-eng.htm. The nuclear (or census or immediate) family consists of a married 
couple or common-law couple with or without children, or a lone-parent with a child or children where each child 
must be under 25 and without his/her own spouse or child living in the household. Our definition is the same except 
that we only consider children under 18 to be members of the nuclear family. All members of the nuclear family are 
members of the same economic family, defined as a group of two or more persons who live in the same dwelling 
and are related to each other by blood, marriage, common law or adoption. In practice, the difference between 
the nuclear and economic family is small: There were 9,840,730 nuclear families in the 2016 Census compared 
to 9,688,645 economic families (https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/details/Page.
cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=PR&Code1=01&Geo2=&Code2=&Data=Count&SearchText=Canada&SearchType=Begins& 
SearchPR=01&B1=All&GeoLevel=PR&GeoCode=01 ).
9significantly to existing federal and provincial income-support programs to provide a substantial 
boost to the disposable incomes of low-income Alberta households and a reduction in poverty, 
as we discuss further in section 5.1. Secondly, however, as G and BRR rise there is also a greater 
reduction in labour supply (and hence earnings) for AGBI beneficiaries and greater losses in 
disposable income from the introduction of the GBI for those who do not benefit (losers). Losers, 
then, are those whose disposable income drops after the introduction of the GBI due to the fact that 
their GBI is less than their increase in taxes. Thus, raising the BRR from 10 to 25 per cent allows a 
further, more modest reduction in poverty at the expense of work disincentives that reduce earnings 
by a further 5.3 per cent (from 8.7 to 3.4 per cent). The labour-supply disincentives associated with 
income maintenance or anti-poverty programs have been a prominent issue, linked to the efficiency 
cost of redistribution, and were the focus of five negative income-tax experiments across North 
America (Hum and Simpson, 1993). Moreover, political support for income redistribution would 
likely depend on how much losers are expected to pay, as indicated in the final column of Table 2, 
or the additional funding needed to compensate them. 
TABLE 2 IMPACTS ON FAMILIES OF AGBI OPTIONS FOR A BUDGET OF $5.361 BILLION
BRR
Guarantee
(Family of  
1 Adult)1,2
Exit Level  
of Income
Per Cent Change 
in Poverty Rate
Per Cent Change 
in Poverty Depth
Per Cent  
Change in 
Inequality (Gini)
Per Cent Change 
in Earnings 
(Beneficiaries)
Per Cent Change 
in Disposable 
Income (Losers)
0% $1,883 None -6.1 -3.7 -1.0 -0.1 -0.7
10% $6,389 $63,890 -26.3 -25.3 -3.1 -3.4 -2.5
25% $10,159 $40,636 -31.3 -39.4 -3.4 -8.7 -2.8
35% $12,109 $34,597 -34.3 -48.6 -3.5 -12.2 -2.8
50% $14,623 $29,246 -30.3 -64.1 -3.6 -17.2 -2.9
Notes:
1 The guarantee for a two-adult family is (1 adult guarantee) x (square root of 2). 
2  For persons claiming the disability tax credit, there is a top-up of $1,450; for those claiming the caregiver tax credit, 
the top-up is $1,080. 
Since there is no obvious way to reconcile these conflicting objectives of a basic-income design, 
we follow the approach developed in Stevens and Simpson (2017) in choosing a preferred option 
for analysis. That option involves a 10-per-cent BRR, which has several attractive features. The 
10-per-cent BRR is consistent with the existing provincial tax system and delivers significant 
poverty reduction and income redistribution, although further reductions in poverty are possible 
with options involving a higher BRR. Those options would, however, generate much stronger 
adverse work disincentives and possibly other efficiency effects, particularly when a high BRR is 
stacked on other federal and provincial taxes.6 Moreover, a relatively low BRR provides benefits 
to a larger segment of lower-income Canadian families, which enhances its appeal as a support 
program in the same fashion as the new Canada Child Benefit. We now consider our preferred 
design with a 10-per-cent BRR for two budgets: one that includes our selected non-refundable tax 
6 Individuals with taxable income below the level of their tax credits would pay taxes immediately at the chosen BRR 
marginal rate rather than the zero marginal rate applicable under the current system of non-refundable credits. In addition, 
once income exceeds the level of their tax credits, individuals would pay the BRR on top of the provincial marginal tax rate 
of 10 per cent and the applicable federal marginal tax rate of 15 per cent.
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credits but excludes current Alberta refundable tax credits; and one that includes both our selected 
non-refundable tax credits and the refundable credits.7 
5.  IMPACT OF THE AGBI ON POVERTY, LABOUR SUPPLY AND  
DISPOSABLE INCOME
In this section, we model the differential impact of our two AGBI options. The first option is 
financed solely from the removal of the selected NRTCs, with a total budget of $5,357.7 million and 
a BRR of 10 per cent. The second option is financed from the removal of the selected NRTCs and 
the provincial income-transfer programs: the Alberta Child Benefit, the Alberta Employment Tax 
Credit, the Alberta Seniors Benefit and the Alberta Carbon Levy Rebate. This option has the same 
BRR of 10 per cent but an expanded budget of $6,110.6 million. 
The following results show the impact of the financing and delivery of the AGBI on labour supply 
and the value of the AGBI. They also show the change in disposable income after the first-order 
effects of the change in labour supply have been taken into consideration. The labour-supply effects 
are estimated using the midpoint of the range of estimates of labour-supply response from the 
review article by McClelland and Mok (2012, 30, Table 2): an income elasticity of 0.05, substitution 
elasticities of 0.2 for men and single women and 0.3 for married women, and participation 
elasticities of 0.05 for men and single women and 0.15 for married women. These elasticities are 
applied to the changes in after-tax wage rates and income that result from the elimination of the 
selected non-refundable tax credits and the introduction of the refundable GBI as described in 
Stevens and Simpson (2017, 132, Appendix). As we show below, the total effect of the financing and 
delivery of the AGBI is a reduction in the earnings of adults. This reduction then leads to both an 
increase in the value of the AGBI and a reduction in the amount of personal income taxes paid on 
those reduced earnings. It is the post-labour-supply values of the AGBI and the change in provincial 
taxes paid that appear in our results for the two options. As well, the impacts on poverty and 
inequality are calculated based on the post-labour-supply values of the family’s level of disposable 
income. 
5.1 Option 1: AGBI Financed Only With NRTCs
Table 3 shows the average value of the AGBI, the average change in provincial income taxes and 
the average change in disposable income by adjusted economic-family income decile. As noted 
above in Table 2, this AGBI features a BRR of 10 per cent that generates a guarantee of $6,389 for a 
single-adult family and $9,305 for a two-adult family. As it is the nuclear family that is the unit for 
calculating the AGBI benefits, the results are presented at that level. For persons with a disability 
and caregivers of disabled adults there is a top-up to the guarantee of $1,450 and $1,080, 
7 We contemplated a third option that also replaces provincial social assistance with an AGBI. An insurmountable problem 
for this analysis is that the SPSD/M program does not distinguish between social-assistance recipients on Alberta Works 
(AW) in either the “expected to work” or “barriers to full employment” categories, and recipients of benefits under Assured 
Income for the Severely Handicapped (AISH). We could identify the number of Alberta social-assistance recipients who 
are also receiving the federal disability tax credit (5,827), but this drastically undercounts the number of AISH recipients 
(57,946). Thus, we could not see how we could provide a meaningful assessment of the impact of a replacement AGBI on 
those enrolled in AW. 
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respectively, that fully compensates for the value of the existing non-refundable tax credits for 
these conditions.8
TABLE 3  COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NET IMPACT OF AGBI OPTION 1 BY ADJUSTED  
ECONOMIC-FAMILY INCOME DECILES
Family-Income 
Decile
Average
Disposable 
Income1
Average GBI1 Average Loss  of Earnings1
Average 
Provincial Tax 
Increase1
Net Impact of GBI
Per Cent 
Gaining from  
the GBI1
Average
Amount1
Average Per  
Cent Change  
in Income1
1 $15,511 $5,338 $478 $856 +$4,005 +25.8% 98.4%
2 $33,572 $4,115 $650 $1,934 +$1,569 +4.7% 75.6%
3 $42,757 $3,038 $958 $2,249 -$141 -0.3% 37.2%
4 $52,416 $2,334 $793 $2,500 -$942 -1.8% 27.0%
5 $61,035 $1,461 $683 $2,559 -$1,756 -2.9% 16.5%
6 $62,737 $1,440 $299 $2,453 -$1,302 -2.1% 23.5%
7 $76,311 $1,082 $179 $2,602 -$1,695 -2.2% 19.1%
8 $91,186 $975 $98 $2,664 -$1,789 -2.0% 16.3%
9 $96,277 $1,218 $179 $2,547 -$1,506 -1.6% 19.8%
10 $215,708 $919 $82 $2,668 -$1,834 -0.9% 16.7% 
TOTAL $72,204 $2,312 $445 $2,255 -$380 -0.5% 37.3%
Pre-labour-supply cost $5,361.0 M $5,357.7 M
Post-labour-supply cost $5,491.7 M $5,334.1 M
Notes:
1 The averages are for the nuclear family unit.
We note two aspects of the results in Table 3. First, the pre-labour-supply cost of the AGBI is $3.3 
million more than the revenues raised ($5,361.0 million – $5,357.7 million). This arises because the 
replacement of the provincial NRTCs with a GBI causes an increase in federal taxes of $3.7 million 
offset by a $0.1 million increase in federal transfers and a $0.5 million increase in the Alberta 
Seniors Benefit, the cost of which is fully covered by the GBI. By comparison, the post-labour-
supply cost of the AGBI is $130.7 million more ($5,491.7 million – $5,361.0 million) and provincial 
tax revenues are less by $23.6 million ($5,334.1 million – $5,357.7 million) for a total cost increase 
of $154.3 million (2.9 per cent). Second, the impact of the AGBI on the disposable income of the 
nuclear family is reduced by the loss in earnings due to receipt of the AGBI and the additional taxes 
paid to finance it. Consequently, only the two lowest income deciles show an average gain from the 
program, with the remaining deciles showing a loss, an indication of the ability of our GBI scheme 
to target benefits to those whose income needs are greatest. Overall, 37 per cent of all families gain 
from the AGBI but the gains are directed at the bottom income decile, which has by far the greatest 
income gain of 25.8 per cent, and more modestly to the second-lowest income decile (4.7 per cent). 
Income losses are moderate and scattered across the top eight deciles, reaching a peak of 2.9 per 
cent for families in the fifth decile due to the sharp drop in GBI benefits at this point.
The overall change in family disposable income produced by the AGBI is categorized by family 
type in Table 4. Overall, single-parent families and the non-elderly and elderly single persons 
benefit from the AGBI, while two-parent families and non-elderly and elderly couples lose from 
8 
Since the AGBI and top-ups are refundable credits whose benefits are targeted to low-income families, families with higher 
incomes will still realize modest income losses even when families include persons with a disability and caregivers of 
disabled adults.
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the introduction of the AGBI. These overall gains and losses by family type are modest, however, 
and the important feature of the scheme remains the concentration of benefits in the lowest income 
deciles regardless of family type. For the bottom income decile, elderly couples gain the most, 
followed by the non-elderly single persons and non-elderly couples. There are also substantial gains 
for non-elderly single persons and single parents as far as the fourth decile.
TABLE 4  PER CENT CHANGE IN NUCLEAR-FAMILY DISPOSABLE INCOME BY FAMILY TYPE AND INCOME 
DECILE FOR AGBI OPTION 1
Family-
Income Decile Single Parent Two Parent
Non-elderly 
Single 
Non-elderly 
Couple
Elderly
Single
Elderly
Couple All Families
1 +15.2% +17.2% +31.4% +20.2% +12.2% +52.6% +25.8%
2 +3.7% -0.3% +9.8% +2.8% +6.7% +5.8% +4.7%
3 +3.2% -3.6% +4.2% -3.0% +2.3% -0.4% -0.3%
4 +1.6% -3.3% +3.4% -4.3% +0.3% -3.2% -1.8%
5 -2.1% -3.1% +0.2% -5.3% -2.7% -3.7% -2.9%
6 -0.9% -2.8% +0.8% -4.5% +0.4% -2.6% -2.1%
7 -1.3% -2.5% 0.0% -3.7% -1.0% -3.7% -2.2%
8 -0.9% -2.1% -0.1% -3.1% -1.7% -2.5% -2.0%
9 -0.1% -1.9% 0.0% -2.5% -0.0% -2.5% -1.6%
10 -0.1% -0.9% -0.1% -1.2% -0.2% -0.9% -0.9%
TOTAL +2.0% -2.0% +3.0% -2.4% +1.8% -1.2% -0.5%
The pattern of one-adult families — single parents and non-elderly and elderly single persons — 
benefitting from the AGBI at the expense of two-adult families — two parents and non-elderly and 
elderly couples — is consistent with results in Stevens and Simpson (2017).9 To explore this feature 
a bit further, Table 4A breaks down the net impacts reported in Table 3 by family type. The table 
shows that, while benefits are reasonably consistent across family types, families with two adults 
pay higher taxes and have a greater labour-supply response (reduction in earnings) than families 
with one adult. The difference in taxes likely reflects a difference in the distribution of one-adult 
and two-adult families across the income spectrum, with a larger concentration of one-adult 
families in lower income deciles. 
 TABLE 4A NET IMPACT OF AGBI OPTION 1 BY FAMILY TYPE
Economic-family type Average AGBI Average Change in Taxes
Average Change in 
Earnings
Average Change in 
Disposable Income
 Per Cent Change in 
Disposable Income
One Adult:
Single Parent $2,246 $1,083 -$410 $753 1.0%
Non-Elderly Single $2,504 $1,548 -$476 $480 1.0%
Elderly Single $2,473 $1,874 -$43 $556 1.2%
Two Adults:
Two Parent $2,187 $2,451 -$517 -$781 -0.9%
Non-Elderly Couple $2,021 $2,484 -$537 -$1,001 -1.2%
Elderly Couple $2,809 $2,783 -$250 -$231 -0.3%
All Households $2,312 $2,245 -$445 -$380 -0.5%
9 See Table 9 (p. 130) and Table 15 (p. 135).
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Table 5 presents the impact of the AGBI on poverty and income inequality by economic-family 
type. The overall impact is about equal for the rate and depth of poverty, reducing these measures 
by 23 and 24 per cent respectively.10 Income inequality, as measured by the Gini index, is reduced 
by 1.6 per cent. The biggest impact of poverty occurs for the single-parent family, where it is 
completely eliminated. Poverty, which was already at a low rate for two-parent families, non-
elderly couples, and the elderly, falls further and is virtually eliminated for all these groups, 
although the depth of poverty remains high for the few two-parent families and non-elderly couples 
who remain poor. Although non-elderly single persons experience a substantial improvement 
in their disposable income, the impact on poverty is more modest because of the deep poverty 
experienced by this group, as can be seen in Table 5. With an average depth of poverty of 49 per 
cent currently, the AGBI can only reduce the depth of poverty by 27 per cent and the incidence of 
poverty by 16 per cent for this group. 
TABLE 5  IMPACT OF AGBI OPTION 1 ON THE RATE AND DEPTH OF POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY BY 
ECONOMIC-FAMILY TYPE
Family Type1
Rate of Poverty Depth of Poverty Income Inequality
Pre Post Per cent change Pre Post
Per cent 
change Pre Post
Per cent 
change
SP 10.8% 0.0% -100% 26.6% 0.0% -100% 36.35 29.59 -19%
TP 3.2% 1.8% -44% 42.4% 40.1% -5% 37.10 36.18 -2%
NES 28.3% 23.7% -16% 49.1% 35.9% -27% 45.42 41.93 -8%
NEC 1.4% 0.3% -79% 25.6% 21.3% -17% 39.54 39.63 +0.2%
ES 0.0% 0.0% 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% 33.42 31.00 -7%
EC 1.4% 1.8% +29% 36.5% 10.0% -73% 47.65 47.09 -1%
TOTAL 9.9% 7.6% -23% 45.9% 34.9% -24% 50.57 49.78 -1.6%
Note: 
1    SP = single parent; TP = two-parent family; NES = non-elderly single person; NEC = non-elderly couple; ES = elderly 
single person; EC = elderly couple.
Another way to portray the redistribution that takes place from a plan of this nature is to consider 
the total gains realized as a per cent of the total AGBI for the post-labour-supply expenditure of 
$5,491.7 million. As shown in Appendix B, the additional benefits at the level of the nuclear family 
are $3,262.7 million, indicating that 59 cents out of every dollar in the AGBI budget is redistributed 
from richer to poorer households. Although the extent of redistribution is highest for the poorest 
income decile, at 83.7 cents on the dollar, significant redistribution exceeding 36 cents on the dollar 
occurs across all income deciles.
5.2 Option 2: AGBI Financed with NRTCs and Provincial RTCs
Our second option expands the AGBI budget by incorporating a set of provincial income-tested 
benefit programs whose design is similar to our GBI refundable-tax-credit plans. These programs, 
which are described in more detail in Appendix A, include the Alberta Child Benefit, the Alberta 
Family Employment Tax Credit, the Alberta Seniors Benefit and the Alberta Carbon Levy Rebate. 
Their inclusion increases the GBI budget by a net amount of $754.8 million to $6,110.6 million. 
This option enriches the guarantee for a single adult to $6,801. Table 6 shows the average value of 
10 The poverty rates reported here are based on the 2014 Canada Income Survey data adjusted to 2017 incomes by the income 
and population inflators used by SPSD/M. They therefore differ from the poverty rates reported in Section 1 and Figure 1, 
which are based on the 2015 Canada Income Survey.
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this AGBI, the average change in taxes, refundable credits and earnings and the average change in 
disposable income by adjusted economic-family income decile. 
Despite the greater generosity of this second option, there are many similar results.11 While the 
average AGBI is some $324 more than the previous option ($2,636 as opposed to $2,312 from Table 
3), the net adverse impact on disposable income is actually larger (–$441 as opposed to –$380 in 
Table 3) because the average loss in earnings is greater (–$518 compared to –$445). Furthermore, 
families in the lower income deciles are worse off under this option than under the previous, less 
generous AGBI option. The average per cent change in income is lower for the first three deciles 
and the per cent benefitting from the program declines from 37.3 to 36.4 per cent. The smaller 
per cent change for the lowest three family-income deciles arises primarily from the design of the 
Alberta Child Benefit, which doesn’t start clawing back benefits until $25,832 of net family income, 
and the Family Working Income Supplement, which provides increasing benefits based on earnings 
until $41,786 of family income, as shown in Appendix A. 
TABLE 6  COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NET IMPACT OF AGBI OPTION 2 BY ADJUSTED  
ECONOMIC-FAMILY INCOME DECILES
Family-Income 
Decile
Average
Disposable 
Income1
Average GBI1
Average Loss 
of Provincial 
Tax Credits1
Average Loss 
of Earnings1
Average Tax 
Increase1
Net Impact of GBI
Per Cent 
Gaining  
from the GBI1
Average
Amount1
Average Per 
Cent Change  
in Income1
1 $15,511 $5,823 $455 $489 $856 +$4,023, +25.9% 96.4%
2 $33,572 $4,723 $940 $645 $1,931 +$1,217 +3.6% 66.8%
3 $42,757 $3,558 $681 $1,029 $2,248 -$369 -0.9% 36.7%
4 $52,416 $2,767 $342 $926 $2,497 -$973 -1.9% 27.4%
5 $61,035 $1,814 $171 $906 $2,560 -$1,784 -2.9% 16.5%
6 $62,737 $1,690 $137 $478 $2,451 -$1,358 -2.2% 24.5%
7 $76,311 $1,237 $102 $281 $2,601 -$1,738 -2.3% 19.1%
8 $91,186 $1,102 $83 $125 $2,664 -$1,770 -1.9% 16.6%
9 $96,277 $1,373 $86 $196 $2,547 -$1,453 -1.5% 21.1%
10 $215,708 $1,024 $62 $85 $2,668 -$1,794 -0.8% 17.0%
TOTAL $72,204 $2,63608 $318 $518 $2,254 -$441 -0.6% 36.4 %
PRE-LABOUR-SUPPLY COST $6,113.2 M $754.8 M $5,355.8 M
POST-LABOUR-SUPPLY COST $6,196.4 M $5,323.0 M
Note:
1  The averages are for the nuclear family unit.
Table 7 shows the change in disposable income by family type and income decile for this AGBI 
option. Compared to Table 4, only the non-elderly single adult does consistently better under this 
option. Non-elderly couples and elderly singles and couples in the lowest decile also do better under 
this option, but both single- and two-parent families do less well. Overall, those in the first three 
income deciles show a smaller positive change in their disposable income under this option. In 
sum, the additional income provided by the elimination of the four provincial refundable tax credits 
11 
As was the case for the first option, the pre-labour-supply cost of the AGBI is $2.4-million more than the revenues raised 
($6,113.0 – ($5,355.8 + $754.8)). This occurs because the cancellation of the provincial NRTCs causes the SPSD/M model 
to generate increased federal taxes of $3.0 million that are offset by a $0.6-million increase in federal transfers and these 
cost increases are fully covered by the GBI such that there is no overall change in disposable income. By comparison, the 
post-labour-supply cost of the AGBI is $83.2-million more ($6,196.4 – $6,113.2) and tax revenues are less by $32.8 million 
($5323.0M - $5355.8M) for a total cost increase of $116.0 million (+1.9 per cent).
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does not lead to higher disposable incomes because the lost income from the refundable tax credits 
exceeds the increase in GBI benefits.
TABLE 7  PER CENT CHANGE IN NUCLEAR-FAMILY DISPOSABLE INCOME BY FAMILY TYPE AND INCOME 
DECILE FOR AGBI OPTION 2
Income Decile Single Parent Two Parent Non-elderly Single 
Non-elderly 
Couple
Elderly
Single
Elderly
Couple All Families
1 +8.8% +11.2% +32.7% +21.6% +16.5% +53.6% +25.9%
2 -0.3% -18% +10.6% +3.7% +3.3% +5.9% +3.6%
3 -0.1% -4.1% +4.8% -2.4% -3.4% -0.1% -0.9%
4 -1.2% -3.9% +4.0% -3.8% +0.5% -2.8% -1.9%
5 -2.6% -3.2% +0.0% -5.4% -2.2% -3.5% -2.9%
6 -1.3% -2.8% +0.8% -5.0% +0.7% -2.4% -2.2%
7 -1.7% -2.5% +0.1% -3.9% -0.6% -3.8% -2.3%
8 -1.5% -2.1% +0.0% -3.1% -1.6% -2.5% -1.9%
9 -0.3% -1.9% +0.2% -2.5% +0.1% -2.5% -1.5%
10 -0.1% -0.9% +-0.0% -1.2% -0.2% -0.9% -0.8%
TOTAL +0.1% -2.2% +3.2% -2.4% +1.0% -1.1% -0.6%
Table 8 shows the impact on poverty and income inequality. The overall impact is about the same 
as in Table 5, a 23- to 24-per-cent reduction in the rate and depth of poverty and a one- to two-per-
cent reduction in income inequality. For the single non-elderly person, this AGBI option leads to 
a slightly larger reduction in the rate and depth of poverty and income inequality, but this gain is 
offset by higher rates of poverty for the single parent and elderly singles and couples. This second 
AGBI option, which replaces both refundable and non-refundable Alberta tax credits, does not 
perform as well as the first option that replaced only the non-refundable credits and will not be 
considered in the next section that looks at the combined impact of a federal and Alberta GBI.
TABLE 8  IMPACT OF AGBI OPTION 2 ON THE RATE AND DEPTH OF POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY BY 
ECONOMIC-FAMILY TYPE
Family Type
Rate of Poverty Depth of Poverty Income Inequality
Pre Post  Per cent change Pre Post
 Per cent 
change Pre Post
 Per cent 
change
SP 10.8% 0.0% -100% 26.6% 0.0% -100% 36.35 30.23 -17%
TP 3.2% 1.8% -44% 42.4% 41.46% -2% 37.10 36.26 -2%
NES 28.3% 23.6% -17% 49.1% 35.4% -28% 45.42 41.76 -8%
NEC 1.4% 0.3% -79% 25.6% 24.4% -5% 39.54 39.60 +1%
ES 0.0% 0.2% n/a 0.0% 1.9% 33.42 32.06 -4%
EC 1.4% 1.8% ++29% 36.5% 8.4% -77% 47.65 47.05 -1%
TOTAL 9.9% 7.6% -23% 45.9% 34.5% -25% 50.57 49.83 -1%
Note: As in Table 5.
6. WHAT IF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COLLABORATED?
Since the federal government has expressed interest in poverty reduction and the concept of a 
basic income, and since the federal and provincial tax systems are integrated to a large extent, 
it makes sense to consider an AGBI in the context of a comparable federal plan. We expect that 
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federal collaboration on a basic income would make a significant difference at the provincial level, 
since federal tax credits are about 50-per-cent higher on average than their provincial counterparts 
(Stevens and Simpson, 2017). Given the superior performance of an AGBI financed solely from the 
elimination of selected NRTCs, we now consider the impact for Alberta adults of a combined federal 
and Alberta guaranteed basic income financed solely from the removal of the selected NRTCs. 
6.1 A Federal GBI 
Stevens and Simpson (2017) provide a national framework for the implementation of a basic income 
through the conversion of non-refundable tax credits to a refundable credit. The financing of a 
federal GBI features the removal of the same set of NRTCs as the Alberta GBI and the elimination 
of the federal GST credit (GSTC). The total revenue raised by these two measures is $51,577.6 
million across Canada, including $47,297.6 million from the NRTCs and $4,280.0 from the GSTC. 
Table 9 revisits the menu of choices available at the federal level and illustrates the same pattern of 
conflicting objectives as in Table 2: As the BRR and G rise, the incidence and depth of poverty fall, 
but at the expense of rising work disincentives reflected in lower earnings and declining disposable 
income. Moreover, at higher BRR and G combinations, fewer low-income families receive benefits. 
As in Stevens and Simpson (2017), we adopt a federal BRR of 15 per cent that provides a single-
adult G of $7,285 as our preferred option on the basis of: its consistency with the existing tax 
system; its ability to deliver significant poverty reduction and income redistribution to a large 
segment of all families; its estimated smaller impact on earnings and net change in disposable 
incomes; and its ability to address concerns about tax stacking that arise with higher BRR options. 
As with the provincial GBI, we add a top-up to the guarantee of $1,220 for those claiming a 
disability tax credit and of $710 for those claiming the caregiver tax credit. These amounts reflect 
the full value of the non-refundable tax credits. This GBI would be calculated separately from the 
AGBI but would supplement low-income Alberta households in much the same way.
TABLE 9 IMPACTS ON FAMILIES OF FEDERAL GBI OPTIONS FOR A BUDGET OF $51.578 BILLION
BRR
Guarantee
(Family of 1 
Adult)1,2 
Exit Level of 
Income
 Per Cent Change 
in Poverty Rate
 Per Cent Change 
in Poverty Depth
 Per Cent Change 
in Inequality 
(Gini)
 Per Cent Change 
in Earnings 
(Beneficiaries)
 Per Cent Change 
in Disposable 
Income (Losers)
0% $2,083 None -7.7 -3.7 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1
10% $5,978 $59,780 -34.6 -10.4 -2.0 -3.2 -2.8
15% $7,285 $48,567 -38.5 -16.8 -2.0 -4.7 -3.1
25% $9,436 $37,744 -43.3 -26.9 -1.9 -8.2 -3.4
35% $11,242 $32,120 -44.2 -38.7 -1.7 -11.6 -3.6
50% $13,606 $27,212 -44.2 -50.9 -1.6 -16.5 -3.7
Notes:
1 The guarantee for a two-adult family is (one-adult guarantee) x (square root of two).
2  For persons claiming the disability tax credit, there is a top-up of $1,220; for those claiming the caregiver tax credit, 
the top-up is $710. 
A federal GBI that fully offsets the loss in income resulting from the effects of removing the 
federal NRTCs and the elimination of the GSTC actually costs an estimated $51,521.9 million, 
or about $56-million less than the additional tax revenues generated according to calculations 
made by SPSD/M. This reduction in cost and plan benefits arises because of estimated reductions 
in provincial income taxes ($37.5 million) and federal transfers ($4.8 million) and an estimated 
increase in provincial transfers ($23.0 million) arising from the implementation of a federal GBI. 
Once we evaluate the labour-supply impact of the federal GBI option, using the same methodology 
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and response elasticities as described in Section 5, Table 10 reveals modest declines in total 
disposable income, amounting to $770 or 1.1 per cent for Alberta and 0.6 per cent for Canada as a 
whole. Alberta contributes 3.7-per-cent more in taxes ($2,348) than the Canadian average ($2,264) 
and receives on average 19.3-per-cent less in GBI benefits than the federal plan ($2,063 compared 
to $2,557).12 
TABLE 10  AVERAGE CHANGE IN FEDERAL TAXES AND THE GSTC, AVERAGE FEDERAL GBI BENEFIT AND  
AVERAGE CHANGE IN DISPOSABLE INCOME FOR THE 15 -PER-CENT BRR OPTION BY PROVINCE — 2017
Jurisdiction Average Change in Federal Taxes1 Average Change in the GSTC
1 Average GBI Benefit 1 Average Change in Disposable Income1 (Per Cent)
NF +$2,595 -$196 $2,302 -$755 (-1.3%)
PE +$2,554 -$222 $2,683 -$577 (-1.1%)
NS +$2,466 -$213 $2,597 -$463 (-0.9%)
NB +$2,486 -$228 $2,620 -$497 (-0.1%)
QC +$1,982 -$219 $2,661 -$11 (-0.02%)
ON $2,301 -$212 $2,682 -$231 (-0.4%)
MB $2,382 -$214 $2,558 -$521 (-1.0%)
SK $2,477 -$192 $2,219 -$798 (-1.2%)
AB $2,348 -$166 $2,063 -$770 (-1.1%)
BC $2,389 -$201 $2,511 -$491 (-0.9%)
CANADA $2,264 -$206 $2,557 -$322 (-0.6%)
Note:
1  These are the averages for all families, regardless of GBI recipient status. 
Table 11 shows the distribution of federal GBI benefits for Albertans by economic-family income 
decile for our preferred BRR of 15 per cent and single-adult guarantee of $7,285. The results reflect 
the changes to the federal GBI and federal taxes paid due to the first-order labour-supply effects 
produced by the GBI. Only the bottom two deciles gain from the federal GBI, illustrating again the 
ability of a modest BRR option to direct benefits primarily to the poorest families. Income losses 
are again moderate and scattered across the top eight deciles, reaching a peak average of three per 
cent for those families in the fourth and fifth deciles. Overall, Albertans lose 1.1 per cent of their 
disposable income as a result of the federal GBI.
12 
Quebec is the clear beneficiary in our federal GBI, contributing only 87.5 per cent of the Canadian average in taxes while 
receiving 104.1 per cent of the average federal GBI benefit, such that the average reduction in disposable income is only $11 
(0.02 per cent).
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TABLE 11  AVERAGE FEDERAL GBI, AVERAGE CHANGE IN TAXES AND DISPOSABLE INCOME BY ADJUSTED 
ECONOMIC-FAMILY INCOME DECILES — ALBERTA 2017 — POST-LABOUR-SUPPLY ESTIMATES
Adjusted Family- 
Income Decile
Average  
GBI
Average Change in 
Taxes and GSTC
Average Change  
in Earnings
Average Change in Disposable Income
$  Per Cent
1 $5,633 +$1,491 -$470 +$3,671 +23.7%
2 $3,713 +$2,751 -$775 +$187 +0.6%
3 $2,225 +$2,558 -$834 -$1,165 -2.7%
4 $1,647 +$2,783 -$450 -$1,570 -3.0%
5 $1,010 +$2,622 -$240 -$1,832 -3.0%
6 $1,284 +$2,583 -$103 -$1,376 -2.2%
7 $990 +$2,686 -$84 -$1,726 -2.3%
8 $884 +$2,733 -$113 -$1,914 -2.1%
9 $1,103 +$2,572 -$154 -$1,584 -1.6%
10 $840 +$2,664 -$124 -$1,884 -0.9%
TOTAL $2,063 +$2,514 -$345 -$770 -1.1%
6.2 A Federal and Alberta GBI
There are two ways to model a joint federal and provincial GBI. Both options feature a federally 
funded national GBI with one G and BRR set for the entire country that ensures that, overall, 
families are fully compensated for the change in disposable income due to the loss of federal 
NRTCs and the GSTC. At the provincial level, one model has each province removing the same 
provincial NRTCs and providing that income to the federal government to augment the value of G, 
such that the additional cost of the GBI equals the additional revenue provided. With this plan, the 
value of G will vary by province but there will be one BRR. The other model has each province 
delivering its own GBI that parallels the federal design but with its own G and BRR financed by the 
removal of the same set of NRTCs as the federal plan. With this model, there is both a federal and 
provincial BRR applied to income, resulting in a stacking of the BRRs. It is this second model that 
we feature below as it is consistent with the Alberta tradition of designing and financing its own 
parallel child tax credits and working income tax credits. 
Parallel federal and provincial GBIs feature a federal guarantee for a single-adult family of $7,285 
and a BRR of 15 per cent combined with a provincial guarantee for a one-adult family of $6,389 
and a BRR of 10 per cent from our first AGBI option. The same federal and provincial top-ups to 
G for disability and caregiver conditions apply, as noted above. The total budget of the combined 
federal and provincial GBI for Alberta is $11,351.0 million, consisting of $5,610.1 million in 
additional federal taxes, $393.6 million in foregone GST credits, $1.8 million in lower federal 
transfers, $5,345.6 million in additional provincial taxes and $0.2 million in higher provincial 
transfers. However, as Table 12 shows, the pre-labour-supply cost of the combined GBI is only 
$10,105.7 million, due to the fact that the cost of the federal GBI for Albertans is $1,245.3-million 
less than the federal revenues raised. In comparison, the post-labour-supply cost of the combined 
GBIs is $10,673.5 million, some $567.8-million more. In addition, the post-labour-supply combined 
tax revenues are $233.4-million less, for a combined increase in the cost of the GBIs of $801.2 
million, which represents 7.9 per cent of the total pre-labour-supply cost of the program. 
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TABLE 12  COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NET IMPACT OF A COMBINED ALBERTA-FEDERAL GBI  
BY ADJUSTED ECONOMIC-FAMILY INCOME DECILES — POST-LABOUR-SUPPLY ESTIMATES
Family- 
Income  
Decile
Average
Disposable 
Income1
Average GBI1,2
Average 
Loss of
GSTC1
Average Loss 
of Earnings1
Average Tax 
Increase1
Net Impact of GBI
Per Cent 
Gaining from 
the GBI1
Average
Amount1
Average Per 
Cent Change  
in Income1
1 $15,511 $11,089 $413 $941 $1,925 +$7,810 +50.4% 97.8%
2 $33,572 $8,015 $398 $1,367 $4,225 +$2,024 +6.0% 61.4%
3 $42,757 $5,519 $182 $2,271 $4,417 -$1,351 -3.2% 28.9%
4 $52,416 $4,164 $133 $1,894 $4,919 -$7,783 -5.3% 21.5%
5 $61,035 $2,621 $59 $1,674 $4,893 -$4,005 -6.6% 14.6%
6 $62,737 $2,805 $94 $790 $4,835 -$2,916 -4.6% 22.4%
7 $76,311 $2,134 $67 $484 $5,165 -$3,582 -4.7% 16.6%
8 $91,186 $1,914 $70 $293 $5,328 -$3,776 -4.1% 14.5%
9 $96,277 $2,387 $73 $474 $5,017 -$3,176 -3.3% 18.5%
10 $215,708 $1,805 $66 $248 $5,271 -$3,785 -1.8% 15.8%
TOTAL $72,204 $4,493 $166 $1,047 $4,514 -$1,234 -1.7% 33.5%
PRE-LABOUR-SUPPLY COST $10,105.7 M $393.6 M $10,955.8 M
POST-LABOUR-SUPPLY COST $10,673.5 M $10,722.4 M
Notes:
1 The averages are for the nuclear-family unit receiving the GBI.
2  For persons claiming the disability tax credit, there is a federal top-up of $1,220 combined with a provincial top-up of 
$1,450; for those claiming the caregiver tax credit, there is a federal top-up of $710 combined with a provincial top-up 
of $1,080. 
The overall average value of the post-labour-supply combined GBI is $4,493 with offsetting 
losses of $166 in GST credits, earnings losses of $1,047 and tax increases of $4,514, for an overall 
decrease in disposable income of $1,234, which represents 1.7 per cent of pre-GBI income. For 
those in the first two income deciles, the combined net value of their GBIs result in increases in 
their disposable income of 50.4 per cent and six per cent, respectively. Virtually all families in the 
lowest income decile receive benefits, and most (61.4 per cent) receive benefits in the second decile. 
The remaining deciles experience modest average decreases in their disposable income, with the 
largest decrease experienced by those in the fifth decile, as fewer families receive benefits in higher 
income deciles. In total, 33.5 per cent of Alberta families show an increase in their disposable 
income due to the GBIs. 
Table 13 presents the post-labour-supply impact of the combined GBIs on the disposable income of 
nuclear families by the type of family and the income decile. Consistent with the results presented 
in Table 4 for the provincial GBI and earlier results in Stevens and Simpson (2017), single-parent 
families and non-elderly and elderly single adults experience an overall increase in their disposable 
income while two-parent families and non-elderly and elderly couples experience a drop in their 
disposable income. The non-elderly single person benefits the most from the combined GBI, as 
those in the first four deciles of this family group show gains. Single parents also do well, with 
those in the first four deciles also showing gains on average. The largest losses in disposable 
income are experienced by the non-elderly couple in the fifth decile (–11.5 per cent) and the elderly 
couple in the fourth decile (–10.9 per cent).
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TABLE 13  PER CENT CHANGE IN NUCLEAR-FAMILY DISPOSABLE INCOME BY FAMILY TYPE AND INCOME 
DECILE FOR A COMBINED ALBERTA-FEDERAL GBI
Income Decile Single Parent Two Parent Non-elderly Single 
Non-elderly 
Couple
Elderly
Single
Elderly
Couple All Families
1 +28.6% +31.3% +62.6% +39.2% +20.0% +105.1% +50.4%
2 +3.7% -2.1% +17.2% +3.6% +8.0% +5.2% +6.0%
3 +3.6% -8.8% +6.1% -8.2% +0.4% -6.1% -3.2%
4 +2.1% -7.0% +4.8% -10.3% -3.3% -10.9% -5.3%
5 -4.1% -6.4% -0.4% -11.5% -7.6% -10.7% -6.6%
6 -2.0% -5.6% +1.0% -9.3% -1.9% -7.1% -4.6%
7 -3.0% -5.0% -0.2% -7.5% -3.1% -8.5% -4.7%
8 -3.2% -4.2% -0.5% -6.2% -4.1% -5.8% -4.1%
9 -0.2% -3.7% -0.4% -5.0% -0.7% -5.6% -3.3%
10 -0.1% -1.8% -0.4% -2.4% -0.7% -1.9% -1.8%
TOTAL +2.9% -4.2% +5.3% -5.0% +1.0% -4.0% -1.7%
Table 14 presents the combined impact of the two GBIs on the rate and depth of poverty and 
income inequality. Overall, the rate of poverty drops by 44 per cent and is completely eliminated 
for single parents, non-elderly couples, elderly singles and elderly couples, and is almost entirely 
eliminated for two-parent families. Only for the non-elderly single person does some poverty 
remain and it is greatly diminished in size, as the incidence of poverty falls by 36 per cent and 
the depth of poverty declines by 58 per cent. The degree of inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, falls by 2.2 per cent overall, but declines by 32 per cent among single-parent families. 
TABLE 14  IMPACT OF THE COMBINED ALBERTA-FEDERAL GBI ON THE RATE AND DEPTH OF POVERTY AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY BY ECONOMIC-FAMILY TYPE
Family Type
Rate of Poverty Depth of Poverty Income Inequality (Gini)
Pre Post Per cent change Pre Post
Per cent 
change Pre Post
Per cent 
change
SP 10.8% 0.0% -100% 26.6% 0.0% -100% 36.35 24.60 -32%
TP 3.2% 1.1% -66% 42.4% 18.9% -55% 37.10 35.91 3%
NES 28.3% 18.0% -36% 49.1% 20.7% -58% 45.42 38.71 -15%
NEC 1.4% 0.0% -100% 25.6% 0.0% -100% 39.54 39.98 +1%
ES 0.0% 0.0% n/a 0.0% 0.0% n/a 33.42 29.88 -10%
EC 1.4% 0.0% -100% 25.6% 0.0% -100% 47.65 47.61 -0%
TOTAL 9.9% 5.5% -44% 45.9% 21.1% -54% 50.57 49.45 -2.2%
Note: As in Table 5.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our paper demonstrates that a guaranteed basic income (GBI) achieved by transforming most 
existing non-refundable tax credits (NRTCs) into a single refundable credit can have substantial 
impact on poverty in Alberta. Rather than developing a standalone basic-income scheme that 
involves considerable political risk, the government could adopt simple tax measures to alleviate 
poverty, which continues to affect more than six per cent of Albertans despite an extended period 
of vigorous economic growth. Using version 26.0 of the Social Policy Simulation Database and 
Model (SPSD/M), we find that 3,395,000 Albertans claimed these provincial tax credits in 2017, 
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including the universally applicable basic personal amount that accounts for 60 per cent of all 
benefits received and 68 per cent of all income received by the poorest families.
Our analysis considered two options for an Alberta guaranteed basic income (AGBI). Option 1 
involves the transformation of the basic credit and five other NRTCs used in our earlier study 
for Canada (Stevens and Simpson, 2017) with a total value of $5,357.7 million. Option 2 adds 
the Alberta Child Benefit, Alberta Family Employment Tax Credit, Alberta Seniors Benefit and 
Alberta Carbon Levy Rebate to boost the net AGBI budget to $6,110.6 million. Using SPSD/M, 
we simulate the outcomes for these two options along a variety of dimensions, including the 
incidence and depth of poverty, income inequality, labour-market earnings and the distribution of 
beneficiaries. Consistent with our expectations, we show that a rising guarantee (G) and benefit-
reduction rate (BRR) for a given budget results in a greater reduction in the poverty rate and the 
depth of poverty, but at the expense of a greater reduction in labour supply (and hence earnings) 
and disposable incomes and fewer beneficiaries. We found that Option 1 outperformed Option 2 
by leaving those in deciles two to 10 with higher net incomes and more families as net winners. 
Accordingly, we focused the remaining analysis on Option 1. 
We opted for an AGBI plan involving a BRR of 10 per cent that is consistent with the existing 
Alberta tax and tax-credit system. This plan delivers significant poverty reduction and income 
redistribution to a large segment of families with limited impact on labour supply and effective 
marginal tax rates. This produces a guarantee of $6,389 for a single-adult family and $9,035 for a 
two-adult family, in addition to existing income-support benefits that include social assistance and 
the Canada Child Benefit. The impact of the AGBI on the disposable income of the nuclear family 
is reduced by the loss in earnings due to receipt of the AGBI and the additional taxes paid to finance 
it. Overall, 37 per cent of families benefit from our preferred AGBI option, with the highest gains in 
the first three deciles, and the rate and depth of poverty each fall by about 25 per cent. On average, 
single-parent families and non-elderly and elderly single persons see their disposable income 
increase slightly due to the AGBI, while two-parent families and non-elderly and elderly couples 
show a small average loss in disposable income from the introduction of the AGBI. The largest gains 
are appropriately concentrated in the lowest two income deciles for all family types. The biggest 
impact on poverty occurs for the single-parent family, where it is completely eliminated. 
We then considered an AGBI linked to a comparable federal plan, involving the transformation 
of the same NRTCs as the first option, the elimination of the federal GST credit, and a BRR of 15 
per cent as in Stevens and Simpson (2017). While Alberta contributes more in taxes and receives 
lower benefits than other provinces, a federal plan with a guarantee of $7,285 for a single-adult 
family and $10,382 for a two-parent family still provides significant benefits for families with the 
lowest incomes. Moreover, combining the federal GBI with the first AGBI option allows for a total 
GBI budget of $11,359.7 million, which generates a guarantee of $13,674 for a single-adult family 
and $19,338 for a two-adult family. The combined GBI increases the disposable income of the 
two poorest family-income deciles by 50.4 per cent and six per cent, and one-third of all families 
realize an increase in disposable income from the combined GBI. The combined GBI is financed by 
moderate reductions in family income that are spread across the other eight deciles and peak in the 
fifth decile.
As was the case for the provincial AGBI, single-parent families and non-elderly and elderly single 
adults experience an overall increase in their disposable income, but the two poorest income 
deciles benefit for all family types. The rate of poverty among all Albertans now drops by 44 per 
cent and poverty is completely eliminated for single parents and non-elderly and elderly couples. 
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While poverty remains for two-parent families and the non-elderly single person, its rate declines 
substantially and its depth is reduced by more than 50 per cent. The non-elderly single person, the 
family group that exhibits by far the most poverty, receives the most benefit from the combined 
GBI, as families in the lowest-four income deciles all show gains. Inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, falls by 2.2 per cent compared to 1.6 per cent for the provincial AGBI alone. 
Our analysis has attempted to demonstrate the impact that a straightforward tax-policy change 
toward refundable tax credits can have on poverty in Alberta. We do not mean to imply that our 
choice of a specific AGBI plan would accord with all perceptions of what is best for the province. 
Indeed, our argument has laid out several dimensions along which differences in emphasis might 
lie and we welcome further discussion of these and other details of plans of this nature. We have 
also limited the scope of our analysis to poverty reduction, although there are other potentially 
important arguments to support a GBI that are beyond the scope of this paper. A GBI is seen as 
an important component of policy to address the rapid advance of robotics, artificial intelligence 
and other technologies during the “fourth industrial revolution,” which may create widespread job 
destruction, unemployment and hardship within a short timeframe (West, 2015). A GBI can also 
be understood more broadly as an important source of income security or a social insurance policy 
that extends the planning horizon of individuals and families to provide more beneficial outcomes 
to health, education and other indicators of social well-being (Forget, 2011).
The success of our approach, or any approach using the current taxation system, rests on a high 
degree of tax compliance and, in particular, circumstances in which low-income families file tax 
returns and claim appropriate benefits. In this regard, Canada’s modern tax-filing record seems 
promising. The 2016 Census13 reports 28,642,980 persons 15 years of age and over, of which 
27,488,530 had any income. Of those with any income, 27,090,400 filed a tax return, a filing 
rate of 94.6 per cent for all persons 15 years of age and over and 98.6 per cent for those with any 
income. Adoption of a GBI based on tax filing would therefore be effective, especially if it were 
accompanied by additional measures to raise the rate of tax filing even closer to 100 per cent. 
Finally, we would note that reliance on the tax system to deliver benefits raises the problem of 
the timing of benefits, since annual income-tax reconciliation is the current norm and that is 
unlikely to provide sufficient short-term income support to low-income families whose incomes 
fluctuate significantly during the year. In that respect, our proposed GBI would rely on the current 
social-assistance program to deliver emergency income replacement in these situations. Given the 
inadequacy of social assistance in its current form, Alberta might want to consider modifications to 
its welfare system to accompany a tax-based GBI, but that analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
13 Our source is Census tables 98-400-X2016113 and 11-10-0033-01.
23
REFERENCES
Alberta Government (2013). “Together We Raise Tomorrow: Alberta’s Poverty Reduction Strategy,” 
Discussion Paper, June. Accessed at: https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/11df4303-b795-4c7d-a2bf-
5dc1c70fdf24/resource/28faa2ba-8242-4f10-af69-94e8be659a73/download/6881615-2013-Together-
We-Raise-Tomorrow-Albertas-Poverty-Reduction-Strategy-2013-06.pdf.
Alberta Treasury Board and Finance (2000). Budget 2000: New Century. Bold Plans. Government of 
Alberta. http://www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/ Budget/budget1997-2000/2000/tax.pdf.
BC Gov News (2018). “Researchers explore the potential of basic income in B.C.,” July 5. https://news.
gov.bc.ca/releases/2018SDPR0048-001317.
Boadway, Robin, Katherine Cuff and Kourtney Koebel (2016). “Designing a Basic Income Guarantee 
for Canada,” Working Paper No.1371, Department of Economics, Queen’s University, Kingston, 
Ont. Accessed at: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1371.pdf.
Collin, Chantal, and Bonnie Campbell (2008). “Measuring Poverty: A Challenge for Canada,” Social 
Affairs Division, Parliament of Canada PRB 08-65E, revised 17 October. Accessed at: https://lop.
parl.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0865-e.htm.
Conference Board of Canada (2018). How Canada Performs: Poverty. Accessed at: http://www.
conferenceboard.ca/hcp/provincial/society/poverty.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1.
Eisen, Ben, Steve Lafleur and Milagros Palacios (2017). “The End of the Alberta Tax Advantage,” Fraser 
Institute, January. Accessed at: https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/end-of-the-alberta-
tax-advantage.pdf.
Forget, Evelyn (2011). “The Town with No Poverty: The Health Effects of a Canadian Guaranteed 
Annual Income Field Experiment,” Canadian Public Policy 37(3), 283-305.
Gouvernement du Québec (2018). “Guaranteed Minimum Income,” Report of the Expert 
Committee, Québec Portal – Services Québec. Accessed at: http://www.gouv.qc.ca/EN/
RevenuMinimumGaranti/Pages/Accueil.aspx.
Hum, Derek, and Wayne Simpson (1993). “Economic Response to a Guaranteed Annual Income: 
Experience from Canada and the United States,” Journal of Labor Economics 11(1), part 2, S263-96.
Hum, Derek, and Wayne Simpson (2001). “A Guaranteed Annual Income? From Mincome to the 
Millennium,” Policy Options/Options Politiques, January-February, 78-82.
Johnson, David, and Timothy Smeeding (2015). “Income Distribution and Inequality: Measurement 
Issues,” International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (11), 2nd edition, 732-38. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.71044-0.
Liberal Party of Canada (2016). “Poverty Reduction: Minimum Income,” Policy Resolution P-05, May, 
Winnipeg. Accessed at http://winnipeg2016.liberal.ca/policy/poverty-reduction-minimum-income/.
Murphy, Brian, Xuelin Zhang and Claude Dionne (2012). “Low Income in Canada: a Multi-line and 
Multi-index Perspective,” Income Research Paper Series, March, Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 
75F0002M — No.001. Accessed at: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75f0002m/75f0002m2012001-
eng.pdf.
24
Ontario Ministry of Finance (2016). 2016 Ontario Budget Chapter I: Building Prosperity and Creating 
Jobs. Accessed online at: http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/ontariobudgets/2016/ch1e.html.
Parliamentary Budget Office (2018). “Costing a National Guaranteed Basic Income Using the Ontario 
Basic Income Model,” Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 17 April. http://www.pbo-dpb.
gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/Reports/2018/Basic per cent20Income/Basic_Income_Costing_
EN_Final.pdf.
Simpson, Wayne, and Harvey Stevens (2015). “The Impact of Converting Federal Non-Refundable Tax 
Credits into Refundable Credits,” University Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper, vol. 8, 
issue 30, August. On the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). Accessed at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658748.
Statistics Canada (2013). SPSD/M Product Overview. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. See also discussion of 
the latest version 26.0 at: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/180108/dq180108c-eng.htm.
Stevens, Harvey, and Wayne Simpson (2017). “Toward a National Universal Guaranteed Basic Income,” 
Canadian Public Policy 43(2), 120-139.
West, Darrell (2015). “What happens if robots take the jobs? The impact of emerging technologies 
on employment and public policy,” Center for Technology Innovations at Brookings, Brookings 
Institution, October. Accessed at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
robotwork.pdf.
Wilkins, Margarita, and Ronald Kneebone (2018). “Social Policy Trends: Canada’s Official Poverty 
Line,” The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary. Accessed at: https://www.policyschool.ca/
wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Social-Trends-Poverty-Line-August-2018FINAL-USE.pdf.
25
APPENDIX A: ALBERTA INCOME-TESTED BENEFITS — 2017
Program Eligibility Annual Guarantee(Maximum Benefit)
Turning Point  
(Clawback Begins) Benefit-Reduction Rate
Total Beneficiaries and 
Cost ($,000,000)
Alberta Child  
Benefit (ACB)
Families with children 
under 18 with net family 
income under $41,746
1st child: $1,114; 
2nd + child: $557 
$25,832 1 child, 7%;
2 children, 10.5%;
3 children, 14.0 %; 
4+ children, 17.5%
66,810
($82.5)
Alberta Family 
Employment Tax  
Credit (AFETC)
Parent of one or more 
children under 18.
File a tax return.
Have a family working 
income of more than 
$2,760 and a family net 
income of less than:
$61,111, if 1 child;
$78,676, if 2 children;
$89,236 if 3 children;
$92,736, if 4+ children
1 child: $773;
2 children: $1,473;
3 children: $1,898;
4+ children: $2,038;
Minimum Working Family 
Income: $2,760
Turning Point Net Family 
Income: $41,786
Benefit Increase Rate: 11%
Benefit-reduction rate: 
4% 
122,097
($116.3)
Alberta Seniors  
Benefit (ASB)
65+ years of age in 
receipt of federal OAS 
benefits with net family 
income less than $27,690 
for one adult and 
$44,965 for two adults
Basic: $3,360;
Spouse supplement: 
$1,680;
Long-term care 
accommodation 
supplement: $13,059
$0 16.42% for a single adult;
16.45% for a couple
155,790
($459.3)
Alberta Carbon  
Levy Rebate
Alberta resident:
File a tax return
1st adult: $300;
Spouse: $150;
Each child up to 5: $45
Single: $47,500;
Couple: $95,000;
Family: $95,000
Single: 2.67%;
Couple: 4.00%
Family: 4.00%
1,473,477
($381.3)
Source: Statistics Canada, SPSD/M v.26; calculations of beneficiaries and costs by authors.
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APPENDIX B: NET REDISTRIBUTION ($MILLIONS) BY INCOME DECILE FOR AGBI OPTION 1
Adjusted  
Economic-Family 
Income Decile
Per Cent Winners
Winners Losers  Per Cent  
Redistributed  
by DecileTotal Δ in Taxes Total GAI
Benefits  
Redistri-buted
Total Δ in Taxes – 
GAI Non-Recipients
Total Δ in Taxes - 
GAI Recipients Total GAI
Contribu-tions to 
Redistribution
1 98.6 $246.2 $1,580.1 $1,333.9 $0.6 $8.5 $13.8 $4.7 83.7%
2 75.6 $312.9 $807.1 $494.2 $5.8 $161.0 $225.9 $59.2 47.8%
3 37.2 $114.7 $380.8 $266.1 $35.8 $378.3 $343.2 -$70.9 36.8%
4 27 $81.1 $285.7 $204.6 $132.5 $339.3 $235.9 -$235.9 39.2%
5 16.5 $35.8 $186.4 $150.6 $239.4 $292.3 $140.9 -$390.8 46.0%
6 23.5 $60.7 $273.9 $213.3 $390.4 $122.9 $64.5 -$448.8 63.0%
7 19.1 $52.2 $280.3 $228.2 $478.3 $58.5 $37.0 -$499.8 71.9%
8 16.3 $42.8 $176.6 $133.9 $507.1 $46.3 $41.5 -$511.9 61.4%
9 19.8 $51.0 $229.5 $178.5 $470.9 $75.1 $56.3 -$489.7 62.5%
10 16.7 $40.8 $172.3 $131.5 $518.0 $35.0 $31.9 -$521.1 64.4%
TOTAL 37.3 $1,038.1 $4,300.8 $3,262.7 $2,778.8 $1,517.2 $1,190.9 -$3,105.1 59.4%
Note: The discrepancy between benefits redistributed and contributions is $157.6 million.
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